A new round of discussions was held in Djibouti
June 14-18 between the unilaterally declared “Republic of Somaliland” and the
federal Republic of Somalia. The two countries’ presidents’ countries attended
the talks as well as the president and prime minister of Djibouti and Ethiopia,
the US ambassador to Somalia, the president of the Intergovernmental Authority
on Development (IGAD), and representatives of the European Union.
There is nothing new to justify restarting talks
at the present time. In fact, disagreement has been sharper than ever since
Presidents Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo of Somalia and Muse Bihi Abdi of
Somaliland took power in 2017. Both have accused each other of failing to meet
their obligations under previous agreements and causing their collapse.
Although Farmajo issued the first official
apology earlier this year for crimes committed by the Somali government in
Somaliland under President Muhammad Siad Barre (1969-1991), it is unlikely that
there will be any serious breakthroughs on Somaliland’s secession issue. Both
sides are thus focusing on scoring points on secondary issues, such as the
division of international aid. Farmajo is also seeking political victories that
might bolster his chances for re-election in 2021.
The Background
Somaliland unilaterally announced its secession
from Somalia on May 18, 1991. Its claim to sovereignty is based on a narrative
of distinctiveness from the rest of Somalia: it gained its independence from
the UK prior to the rest of Somalia, which was under Italian rule. The two
countries united in 1960 as the “Democratic Republic of Somalia.”
Somaliland remains largely unrecognized within
Africa and globally almost three decades after its secession. The African Union
(AU) sent a fact-finding mission to the region in 2006, which recommended
granting it recognition as an independent country,i and found
that the union established in 1960 had led to much suffering for Somalilanders.ii But the
report was not brought up in the African Union’s ministerial talks, a clear indication
that the AU intends to continue with its established policy of rejecting any
attempts at secession on the continent, on the grounds that this would be
opening a Pandora’s box of border disputes across Africa. Many member countries
have made any future recognition of Somaliland contingent on the federal
government of Somalia issuing its own recognition first. But eight years of
negotiations have thus far not produced any results.
Initial Negotiations (2012-2015)
For many years after declaring independence,
Somaliland consistently ignored the various Somali reconciliation conferences
(the first of which was held in Djibouti in 1991) on the grounds that it is no
longer part of Somalia. On February 23, 2012, however, it participated in the
London Conference,iii marking a
sea change in its position.iv The
points of agreement established by the Conference included an affirmation that
“the International Community should support any dialogue between Somaliland and
the Transitional Federal Government or whoever takes its place in order to
clarify future relations between the two.”v The
president of the federal government, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed also met for the first
time with Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, his Somaliland counterpart, in June 2012. This
was an unprecedented step, and served as the springboard for negotiations after
more than two decades of diplomatic silence.vi
As part of its recent growing interest in
Somalia, Turkey has hosted three of the six rounds of negotiations that have
been held between the two sides since 2012. The first round, which involved the
presidents themselves, was held in Ankara on April 13, 2013 after Somalia had
elected a new president and its government had received full international
recognition. These talks produced the Ankara Document, which included thirteen
points that stipulated, among other things, intelligence-sharing, cooperation
in fighting terrorism, extremism and piracy, and in combatting the illegal
dumping of poisonous materials in Somali waters.vii
This was followed from the 7th to the
9th of July 2013 by the Istanbul Conference which did not discuss
contested issues of sovereignty but resulted in an agreement allowing
Somaliland to receive international aid directly from donors and to enjoy full
control of its airspace. On January 16-19, 2014, another conference was held in
Istanbul. This time it was agreed that a joint body would be established to
monitor air traffic, headquartered in Hargeisa, the Somaliland capital, and
made up of four members (two from each side). The document also contained a
paragraph condemning the mass killings perpetrated by the Somali military
regime against Somaliland’s inhabitants in 1988.viii
On December 21, 2014, a new round of negotiations
was held in Djibouti. The conclusions of earlier negotiations were reaffirmed
and the need to avoid politicizing development aid or making accusations that
might damage the negotiations process was emphasized. A fourth round of
negotiations was also scheduled, to be held in Istanbul ninety days later. But
it was not to be. In the intervening period negotiations broke down––despite
both governments sending delegations in January 2015ix––because the
Somali delegation included Somalilanders. The previous agreement on airspace
was not implemented,x and
discussions ended entirely amid a flurry of mutual accusations.
Relations only worsened with the election of
Farmajo and Abdi as presidents of Somalia and Somaliland respectively in 2017.
The Gulf crisis, which began in the same year, exacerbated disagreements
between the two sides, who adopted different positions on it. A diplomatic
crisis had broken out between the UAE and the Somali government after the Dubai
Ports Company won the contract to manage Somaliland’s Berbera port,xi which
Somalia considered a breach of its sovereignty.xii In an
interview, Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Awad accused the Emirates of
“insulting” Somalia by continuing to deal with a party that lacked any
international legitimacy.xiii
In February of this year, the Ethiopian Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed attempted to jump-start negotiations between the two
parties. He succeeded in getting Farmajo and Bihi Abdi to agree to an
unofficial meeting on the sidelines of the last African Summit held in Addis
Ababa, where he suggested that he and Farmajo should visit Hargeisaxiv just as
he had visited Eritrea in 2018 (resulting in the restoration of relations). But
the Somaliland government refused to host the Somali president unless he
granted them official recognition and called again for the international
community to do likewise.
The Latest from the Djibouti
Negotiations
The current round of negotiations began on the
initiative of Djibouti President Ismail Guelleh.xvi It
appears that the United States and other regional powers––in particular
Djibouti and Ethiopia––are hoping to bring about a lasting solution to a problem
that has dogged the region for three decades. In his opening remarks, Guelleh
emphasized that “after the struggles of the last thirty years, the time for
rebirth is now.”xvii The
Ethiopian prime minister expressed similar sentiments,xviii while
the US ambassador described the conference as a “historic meeting,” encouraging
attendees to do everything possible to further the interests of Somalis.xix
Nonetheless, the four days of negotiations failed
to produce any serious results. Both sides stuck to their guns, with neither
willing to compromise on the principles enshrined in their constitutions:
secession for Somaliland and unity for Somalia. Any progress on the core issue
was impossible. But the parties did agree to continue negotiations in Djibouti
fifteen days later in order to solve the controversial issues of foreign aid,
security, and control of airspace.xx Three
technical subcommittees were formed to deal with these issues.
Prospects of Success
Despite growing international and regional
influence in a solution to the Somali problem––and a corresponding growth in
the opportunities to move the political process forward––the prospects of any
real breakthrough in negotiations between Mogadishu and Hargeisa remain modest.xxi US
involvement is still limited to conventional ambassadorial activity, while
possible regional partners (Ethiopia and Djibouti) have their own serious
domestic problems to deal with. In Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed’s transitional
government has extended its term on the pretext of the coronavirus pandemic.xxii Abiy
Ahmed has long presented himself as the sponsor of peace in the region,
particularly after winning the Nobel Peace Prize last year as a result of the
peace agreement signed with Eritrea.xxiii He has
repeatedly made attempts to solve differences in opinion between African
countries, including the maritime dispute between Somalia and Kenya,xxiv as well
as between different factions in South Sudan.xxv But his
approach to the dispute with Egypt and Sudan over the Renaissance Dam has made
many in the region wary of him.
Turkey has been conspicuous by its absence from
the Djibouti negotiations, given its role as the traditional sponsor of peace
negotiations between Somaliland and Somalia. In 2008, Turkey appointed Oğulcan
Bekar, its former ambassador to Mogadishu, as special envoy to Somalia––the
only country to have such a special envoy. The AU has also been absent, which
has been taken as a measure of how limited the prospects are for progress.
Conclusion
Somaliland has failed to secure international
recognition even thirty years after its unilateral declaration of independence.
Somalia’s Farmajo, meanwhile, refuses to be responsible for granting legitimacy
to its secession––particularly with elections just around the corner. As a
result, it is unlikely that any future negotiations will lead to a real
breakthrough between the two sides until domestic circumstances, or the
regional and international environment, change significantly.
this paper was published on
June 30, 2020 by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in
Doha, Qatar.
Samater2013@gmail.com
Blogger
Hargeisa, Somali-land
Samater2013@gmail.com
Blogger
Hargeisa, Somali-land
